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Case Report
Moral traps: When self-serving attributions backﬁre in
prosocial behavior
Stephanie C. Lin ⁎, Julian J. Zlatev, Dale T. Miller
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Knight Management Center, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
H I G H L I G H T S
• People make self-serving attributions when responding to prosocial requests.
• But, morally self-serving attributions can backﬁre when challenged.
• People are forced into prosocial action if their excuse for refusal is removed.
• This also occurs if an external incentive (e.g., payment) is removed.
a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 18 August 2016
Revised 2 November 2016
Accepted 3 November 2016
Available online 1 December 2016
Two assumptions guide the current research. First, people's desire to see themselves as moral disposes them to
make attributions that enhance or protect their moral self-image: When approached with a prosocial request,
people are inclined to attribute their own noncompliance to external factors, while attributing their own compli-
ance to internal factors. Second, these attributions can backﬁre when put to a material test. Studies 1 and 2 dem-
onstrate that people who attribute their refusal of a prosocial request to an external factor (e.g., having an
appointment), but then have that excuse removed, are more likely to engage in prosocial behavior than those
whowere never given an excuse to begin with. Study 3 shows that people view it asmoremorally reprehensible
to no longer honor the acceptance of a prosocial request if an accompanying external incentive is removed than
to refuse a request unaccompanied by an external incentive. Study 4 extends this ﬁnding and suggests that peo-
ple who attribute the decision to behave prosocially to an internal factor despite the presence of an external in-
centive are more likely to continue to behave prosocially once the external incentive is removed than are those
for whom no external incentive was ever offered. This research contributes to an understanding of the dynamics
underlying the perpetuation of moral self-regard and suggests interventions to increase prosocial behavior.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The pervasive desire for people to see themselves as good and virtu-
ous (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 2004; Monin & Jordan, 2009)
drives them to make self-serving attributions—blaming self-interested
behavior on outside circumstances (Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal,
2015) and taking credit for particularly moral behaviors. An important
but unanswered question, however, is what happens when circum-
stances put those attributions to a material test. For example, suppose
John justiﬁes his decision not to donate to a particular charity with
the claim that the money will go to overhead. How might he react
when he ﬁnds out that the organization actually has low overhead
costs? Will he simply shift to another comforting external attribution
(e.g., the cause is not worthy) or will he feel trapped by his original at-
tribution and now donate? Or, consider Jane, who has a self-interested
reason to engage in a prosocial task (e.g., being paid), but insists that
she would have volunteered regardless of external incentives. Now
imagine circumstances were to change such that the self-interested
beneﬁt was removed (e.g., no longer being paid). Will she decide not
to volunteer after all, or will she act consistently with her original
claim that she would volunteer even if she was not paid?
John and Jane's situations above raise the question of how ﬂexible
the capacity for psychological self-protection is. People are motivated
to make attributions regarding the reasons behind behavior (Bem,
1972; Kelley, 1973). In the case of their own behavior, people are moti-
vated to, and amazingly resourceful at, making attributions that maxi-
mize self-regard (Kunda, 1990; Miller & Ross, 1975). Still, people's
capacity to avoid unpleasant self-relevant conclusions is not inﬁnite
(Kunda, 1990). Both their denials and boasts must be plausible. Conse-
quently, we argue that people have to “walk the talk” of their attribu-
tions, even if doing so is costly. In the context of prosocial requests,
we propose that self-serving attributions, both for compliance and
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noncompliance, can ironically backﬁre; peoplewho confront altered cir-
cumstances that challenge their earlier attributions feel compelled to
act in accordance with them.
In four studies, we test our prediction that self-serving attributions
can backﬁre when challenged. In part I, we hypothesize that, when at-
tributing their refusal of prosocial requests to external factors (e.g., “I
have an appointment at the time”), people will be psychologically
forced into prosocial action when those external factors are removed
(e.g., the appointment is canceled). In part II, we hypothesize that peo-
ple over-attribute their compliance with prosocial requests to intrinsic
motivation and under-attribute it to external incentives andwill be sim-
ilarly psychologically forced into prosocial actionwhen those incentives
are removed.
1. Part I: backﬁring of self-serving attributions during prosocial
request refusal
Because people desire tomaintain amoral self-image, they often feel
uncomfortable engaging in self-other tradeoffs (Lin, Schaumberg, &
Reich, 2016). Although individualsmight prefer to take a self-interested
action, they tend towant to do sowithout incurringmoral self-reproach
(Berman & Small, 2012). For this reason, people have developed justiﬁ-
cations that allow themselves to engage in self-interested behavior
while avoiding attributing that behavior to their own moral character
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Mazar, Amir, &
Ariely, 2008; Pittarello, Leib, Gordon-Hecker, & Shalvi, 2015; Shalvi et
al., 2015). For instance, people can take advantage of ambiguous
moral wiggle room (Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Shalvi, Dana,
Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011) or atone for their wrongdoings by engag-
ing in prosocial or physically cleansing behaviors (Jordan, Mullen, &
Murnighan, 2011; Shalvi et al., 2015; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). One
more straightforward justiﬁcation strategy relevant to the current
research is attributing self-interested behavior to external forces
(Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979).
The present research shows that offering external excuses for self-
interested behavior is not cost-free and can backﬁre if circumstances re-
move the excuse.We argue that claims aboutwhy one didwhat one did
in a particular situation can sow the seeds of a moral test (Miller &
Monin, 2016). Consider the decision not to perform a particular
prosocial behavior. The potential moral reproach from this decision
can be mitigated by invoking a speciﬁc excuse (e.g., having an appoint-
ment at the time). Implicit in this excuse, however, is amoral claim (e.g.,
that one would have volunteered if possible) that heightens moral self-
regard in themoment but sets a “trap” for the person if it is subsequent-
ly removed. To continue to refuse a prosocial request when the reason
one initially gave for refusing it no longer applies (e.g., the appointment
is canceled) would reveal not only that one has failed to live up to this
heightened moral standard, but also that one is a hypocrite, which is a
negative moral signal both to oneself and to others (Andrade & Ariely,
2009; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999;
Kreps & Monin, 2011). Accordingly, people cannot simply replace the
former excuse with a new one, as it would undermine their earlier
claim. Thus, we predict that when a person's excuse for not taking a
prosocial action is removed, he or she will feel increased pressure to
take that action.
We conducted Studies 1 and 2 to provide evidence that people who
are given an excuse to refuse a prosocial requestwould bemore likely to
complywith the requestwhen the excusewas removed than thosewho
were never offered an excuse to begin with. We tested this using a sce-
nario study (Study 1) followed by a study with a behavioral outcome
(Study 2).
1.1. Study 1
Study 1 tested whether people who choose a self-interested action
over a prosocial one when they have an external excuse for doing so
would bemore likely engage in the prosocial action when their original
excusewas removed than thosewhonever had such an excuse.We also
sought to determinewhether enhancedmoral self-regardmediated this
effect.
1.1.1. Methods
1.1.1.1. Participants. Given uncertainty about effect size, we adhered to
the suggestion of using at least 50 participants per condition
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013) and recruited 100 participants
per condition, resulting in 200 participants from Amazon Mechanical
Turk ($0.50 payment, Mage = 32.12, SDage = 10.37, 114 men, 86
women). Data for this and subsequent studies were not analyzed until
data collectionwas completed by AmazonMechanical Turk (sometimes
resulting in slightly larger samples than originally intended). We ex-
clude no data for any study and report all the manipulations and mea-
sures used.
1.1.1.2. Procedure. Participants read a scenario that described how, in the
spirit of the holidays, their townwas offering food service at a local shel-
ter, and that they were conﬂicted about whether to volunteer—they
wanted to help the community, but it would also be a big hassle. In
one condition, participants read that they realized they had an appoint-
ment at the same time. All participants then wrote their thoughts and
feelings in free-response format. They then rated themselves on the
nine traits (1= not at all characteristic ofme, 5= extremely characteristic
of me; α= 0.89) previously shown to be viewed as indicative of moral
character (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and ﬁller items (creative, powerful,
funny, athletic, disorganized, shy, neurotic) included to reduce demand
effects. Afterwards, those who originally had an appointment were told
that it was moved to a different day.
Everyone was then asked how obligated they felt to volunteer, how
guilty they would feel if they did not volunteer, how good they would
feel about themselves if they volunteered, how enjoyable volunteering
would be (on 5-point scales, 1= not at all, 5= extremely), and how like-
ly they would be to volunteer (0–100% slider). Finally, they were asked
why they made the decision that they did in free-response format, and
indicated gender and age.
1.1.2. Results
When people had an excuse not to volunteer, they rated themselves
as higher on moral characteristics than when they did not have an ex-
cuse t(198) = 3.87, p b 0.001, see Table 1 for full statistics. In addition,
of the ﬁller variables, people reported feelingmarginally more powerful
and funny, and signiﬁcantly more creative in the excuse condition than
the control condition, and thus we control for these variables in media-
tion analyses below.
After the excuse was removed, those in the excuse condition
expressedmore obligation to volunteer than those in the no excuse con-
dition, t(198) = 6.48, p b 0.001. Those in the excuse condition also re-
ported, once it was removed, that they would feel more guilty if they
did not volunteer, t(198)=6.48, p b 0.001, andwouldﬁndvolunteering
more enjoyable if they did volunteer, t(198)= 3.39, p b 0.001. They did
not, however, report theywould feel better about themselves if they did
volunteer, t(198) = 1.33, p= 0.185. Finally, participants in the excuse
condition indicated that they would be more likely to volunteer than
those in the control condition, t(198) = 5.48, p b 0.001.
A serial mediation analysis (PROCESS Model 6, Hayes, 2013, see
Fig. 1) revealed that those in the excuse condition rated themselves as
moremoral, leading to higher anticipated guilt if they did not volunteer,
ultimately leading them to be more likely to volunteer 95% CI: [0.95,
4.44] (controlling for power, creativity and humor, 95% CI: [0.54, 3.70]).
1.1.3. Discussion
In Study 1, the availability of an external justiﬁcation (excuse) for
self-interested behavior (not volunteering) elevated participants'
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moral self-regard and allowed those who did not intend to volunteer to
construct the ﬁction that they were the type of person whowould have
volunteered if such a justiﬁcation did not exist. As a consequence, those
who would not have originally volunteered indicated they would vol-
unteer when the justiﬁcation was removed, presumably because of
the guilt they anticipated feeling due to compromising their now-
heightened self-regard and revealing their hypocrisy.
1.2. Study 2
In Study 2, we sought to conceptually replicate Study 1 with a real
behavioral outcome. Speciﬁcally,we predicted that thosewhohad a jus-
tiﬁcation for not acting prosocially (donating to charity) that was subse-
quently removed would be more likely to donate to charity than those
who originally had no such justiﬁcation.
1.2.1. Methods
1.2.1.1. Participants. We aimed to again recruit 200 workers from
Amazon Mechanical Turk, resulting in 203 workers from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (113 men, 88 women, 2 declined to report gender)
who participated in this study (Mage = 32.88, SDage = 10.61, $0.50
payment).
1.2.1.2. Procedure. Participants were told that they would be deciding
whether to allocate an extra $1 to the American Cancer Society or to
themselves. Furthermore, they were told that there would be random
probabilities assigned to each choice representing the likelihood that
the money would actually be allocated to that choice. For instance, the
choice could be between a 40% chance that the $1 would go to ACS
and a 30% chance that the $1 would go to themselves. Participants
viewed an example of this choice frame (30% and 40% were randomly
assigned to the two choices), and responded to comprehension checks.
Once they answered these questions correctly, they moved on to read
about the actual choice.
Participants read that if they chose to allocate the $1 to ACS there
was, depending on the condition, 70% or 100% chance that the money
would go to ACS. Previous research using this paradigm showed that
people use uncertainty about the prosocial choice as an excuse to
make the selﬁsh choice (Exley, 2015). Accordingly, we assumed that
those for whom the choice to donate had a 70% chance of resulting in
donation would feel more justiﬁed in not making this choice than
those for whom the chance was 100%. All participants read that if they
allocated the $1 to themselves, there was a 100% chance that they
would receive the money. Participants then made their Time 1 (T1)
choice.
If participants indicated at T1 that they would allocate themoney to
themselves, they were asked at what probability, if any, they would
change their minds and allocate the money to ACS. If they indicated at
T1 that they would allocate the money to ACS, they were asked at
what probability, if any, they would change their minds and allocate
the money to themselves. Next, all participants were told that, for
protocol reasons, the choice was actually between 100% to ACS and
100% to themselves (see Fig. 2). They were then asked tomake a choice
between those options (T2 choice) using both a binary and a continuous
measure (1= strongly prefer to ACS, 7 = strongly prefer to myself). They
were then asked howunappealing or appealing itwas to give to ACS and
themselves given the 100% ACS vs. 100% self-choice (1= extremely un-
appealing, 7 = extremely appealing).1 Lastly, they indicated any com-
ments or points of confusion they had about the study, their gender,
and their age. Following the study, participants who chose to receive a
bonus were paid, and donations were made on behalf of those who
chose to donate.
1.2.2. Results
At T1, fewparticipants opted to donate to charitywhether theywere
told there was a 70% or 100% probability that the money would go to
charity (6.00% vs. 8.74%). A binomial logistic regression revealed this
difference was not signiﬁcant, B =−0.41, SE = 0.55, p = 0.46, odds
ratio = 0.67. The main dependent variable was likelihood of donating
to ACS at T2, when all participants were told there was a 100% chance
that the money would go to ACS. We found that those who originally
had an excuse (70% condition) were over three times more likely to do-
nate (26.00% [17.4, 34.6]) than those who originally had no excuse
(7.84% [2.62, 13.06]), B= 1.42 [0.61, 2.33], SE = 0.43, p= 0.001, odds
ratio= 4.13, see Fig. 3. See supplemental materials for analyses of addi-
tional variables.
1.2.3. Discussion
In Study 2, although all participants ultimately faced the same choice
between prosocial and self-interested behavior, those who were given
an excuse for not donatingweremore likely to donate when the excuse
was removed than those whowere not originally given the excuse. Par-
ticipants who had a justiﬁcation for choosing not to donate—the uncer-
tainty that the money would actually be donated—were more likely to
donate when they later discovered the donation would certainly go to
charity thanwere thosewhoassumed that the donationwould certainly
go to charity all along. Notably, participants in this study took advantage
of a relatively ﬂimsy excuse, as there was a high probability (70%) that
the money would be donated; previous research has demonstrated
1 Results of these ﬁnal three variables are summarized in the supplemental materials.
Table 1
Main effects of excuse condition on dependent variables in Study 1.
Variable Condition means (SD) B (95% CI) t(198) p Cohen's d
Excuse Control
Moral character 3.92 (0.67) 3.57 (0.57) 0.34 [0.17, 0.52] 3.87 b0.001 0.55
Obligated 3.28 (1.15) 2.27 (1.00) 1.00 [0.70, 1.30] 6.48 b0.001 0.92
Guilty 3.27 (1.25) 2.49 (1.24) 0.77 [0.42, 1.12] 4.36 b0.001 0.62
Feel good 4.00 (0.93) 3.82 (0.93) 0.18 [−0.08, 0.44] 1.33 0.185 0.19
Enjoyable 5.23 (1.41) 4.53 (1.52) 0.70 [0.29, 1.11] 3.39 b0.001 0.48
Likelihood of volunteering 67.12 (28.86) 44.52 (29.24) 22.60 [14.47, 30.73] 5.48 b0.001 0.78
Fig. 1. Serial mediation analysis from Study 1. Values in ﬁgure are unstandardized
regression coefﬁcients controlling for power, humor, and creativity. Value in parentheses
indicates remaining direct effect when controlling for self-ratings of moral characteristics
and anticipated guilt. *p b 0.05, **p b 0.01, ***p b 0.001.
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that peoplewill use uncertainty as an excuse even atmuch higher prob-
abilities (e.g., 95%; Exley, 2015).
2. Part II: backﬁring of self-serving attributions during prosocial
request compliance
Because prosocial behavior prototypically involves putting others'
interests above one's own, engaging in prosocial behavior for a self-in-
terested gain, otherwise known as “tainted altruism,” is often viewed
as less morally pure than engaging in prosocial behavior free from
self-interested motives (Newman & Cain, 2014; Zlatev & Miller, 2016).
One can attempt to mitigate how tainted the act seems by asserting
that one was internally motivated (Barasch, Levine, Berman, & Small,
2014), but doing so will psychologically constrain one's future behavior
if circumstances change. Consider the earlier example of Jane, who was
offered an incentive to engage in a prosocial behavior that was subse-
quently removed. However less appealing the removal of the incentive
makes the prosocial action, failure to take the action would undermine
her moral status even more so than an initial refusal would have done.
As the psychological stakes of not complying have increased, so too,
we predict, does the likelihood of compliance.
Thus, whereas Studies 1 and 2 examined the unintended conse-
quences of over-attributing refusals of prosocial requests to external
justiﬁcations, Studies 3 and 4 examined the unintended consequences
of under-attributing compliance with prosocial requests to incentives.
We hypothesized that people would ﬁnd it to bemorally compromising
to ﬁrst accept a prosocial request when it is accompanied by an external
incentive, and then renege on this decision if the external incentive was
removed. Such a refusal, we contend, would give the lie to their original
claim that their initial compliance reﬂected intrinsic not extrinsic moti-
vation (Study 3). Because of people's reluctance to contradict an earlier
moral claim,we hypothesized that peoplewould bemore likely to com-
ply with a prosocial request when it was initially accompanied by an
external incentive that was then removed than with one that never in-
cluded an external incentive (Study 4).
2.1. Study 3
Study 3 sought to establish that people who ﬁrst are presented with
a request for help accompanied by the expectation of compensation are
judgedmorallymore harshly if they refuse the requestwhen the offer of
compensation is revoked than those who refuse a prosocial request for
which no external incentive was ever offered.
2.1.1. Methods
2.1.1.1. Participants.We again aimed to recruit 200 Amazon Mechanical
Turk workers, resulting in 210 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (122
men, 82women, two identiﬁed as other, four declined to report gender)
who participated in this study (Mage = 32.15, SDage = 9.95, $0.25
payment).
2.1.1.2. Procedure. Participants were assigned to either the paid or non-
paid request condition. In the paid condition, participants read, “Imag-
ine that John was asked whether he would be willing to help serve
food at a local homeless shelter. Hewould be paid $10/hour for helping.
He is not sure whether he has time to help. He is leaning towards help-
ing out, but he hasn't decided yet.” In the non-paid condition, partici-
pants read the same statement, only they were told John would not be
paid for his work. On the next page, participants in the paid condition
read, “The next day, he ﬁnds that, although he thought he would be
paid to help, he was wrong, and the job is volunteer-only. He decides
he is too busy to volunteer after all.” In the non-paid condition, partici-
pants simply read, “The next day, he decides he is too busy to volunteer
after all.”
Participants were then asked to think about what kind of person
John is, and rated John on the moral traits used in Study 1 (1 = not at
all characteristic of John, 5 = extremely characteristic of John; α =
0.94), along with the same ﬁller items. They were also asked why they
judged him the way they did, in free-response format. Lastly, they re-
ported gender and age.
2.1.2. Results
As expected, Johnwas viewed as less moral when he refused the re-
quest to volunteer after initially believing hewould be paid to volunteer
(M = 2.33, SD = 0.79) than if he never believed he would have been
paid (M = 3.09, SD = 0.88), B = −0.76 [−0.98, −0.53], t(206) =
6.51, p b 0.001, d= 0.90 (see Fig. 4). There were no differences by con-
dition for any other traits except shyness (Mpaid = 2.11, SDpaid = 0.95;
Mnon-paid=2.39, SDnon-paid= 1.05; t(203)=1.94, p=0.054, d=0.27).
Fig. 3. Percentage of donation by excuse condition. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Fig. 2. Experimental design of Study 2: choices made at T1 and T2 for the excuse and no
excuse conditions.
Fig. 4. Judgment of moral character by incentive condition in Study 3. Error bars are 95%
conﬁdence intervals.
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2.1.3. Discussion
Study 3 supported our hypothesis that people are judged harshly if it
is assumed that they would only engage in a prosocial action if they
were materially compensated for doing so. That is, a target was viewed
as lessmoral when he refused a prosocial request after paymentwas re-
moved than when he simply refused the request with nomention of an
external incentive. For instance, one participant in the paid condition
stated, “I think John is greedy and also a hypocrite towards other people
and himself, hiding his lack of empathy behind fake motivations (little
time to help the poor).”Wehypothesized that the belief that complying
with a prosocial request when accompanied by external incentives but
refusing to do sowithout them ismorally reprehensible should have be-
havioral consequences similar to those found in Study 2. Speciﬁcally, we
predicted that people would bemorewilling to comply with a prosocial
request when the extrinsic incentive accompanying it was removed
than when no extrinsic incentive was ever offered.
2.2. Study 4
Study 4 examinedwhether people's desire to downplay the role that
an accompanying extrinsic incentive played in their decision to comply
with a prosocial request could lay a futuremoral trap for them. This trap
would be sprung in the event that the originally offered incentive was
removed. Theywould then be trapped into complying because to refuse
to do sowould reﬂect negatively on their moral character, more so even
than if they had refused the request in the ﬁrst instance, as shown in
Study 3. Speciﬁcally, we predicted that people who initially were paid
to engage in a prosocial behavior would be more likely to engage in it
after the paymentwas removed than thosewho had never been offered
payment.
2.2.1. Methods
2.2.1.1. Participants. We anticipated a smaller effect size for this study
than the previous studies and thus aimed to recruit 300 workers from
Amazon Mechanical Turk, resulting in 310 Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers (127 men, 137 women, two identiﬁed as other) who partici-
pated in this study (Mage = 32.10, SDage = 10.67).
2.2.1.2. Procedure. Participants ﬁrst completed a 2-min unrelated study
regarding exercise habits in exchange for $0.25 (at the end of which
gender and age were collected). After the initial study, they learned of
the following prosocial opportunity: “We are collaborating with a
non-proﬁt organization whose goal is to motivate at-risk youth to stay
in school. This organization is collecting essays for the students. Anyone
is qualiﬁed to write these essays! If you agree to write the essay, there
will be more instructions, including essay prompts.” At T1, in the pay-
ment removal condition, they were asked whether they would be will-
ing to write a short essay for this organization in exchange for a $0.75
bonus payment. In the control condition, they were asked if they
would be willing to write a short essay for this organization, but told
that they would not be given a bonus payment.
Following this, participants were asked how helpful they believed it
would be to write the essay for the non-proﬁt, how much good writing
the essay would do, how motivated they were to help at-risk youth,
and how important it was to them to help the non-proﬁt (1 = not at
all, 5 = extremely), all of which were averaged to form one composite
of motivation to help (ɑ= 0.83).
Finally, at T2, all participants were told that, for protocol reasons,
they would not be offered bonus payment for helping the organization.
They then once again indicated whether they would be willing to write
an essay for the organization. Those who chose to write the essay com-
pleted the task as described, for the sake of consistency.
2.2.2. Results
As expected, a binomial logistic regression revealed that, at T1, par-
ticipants in the payment removal condition (36.71%) were more likely
to help than those in the control condition (11.84%), B = −1.46
[−2.07,−0.89], SE = 0.30, p b 0.001, odds ratio = 0.23. Furthermore,
participants in the payment removal condition indicated beingmore in-
trinsically motivated to help (M = 3.04, SD= 0.91) than those in the
control condition (M = 2.77, SD = 0.85), t(308) = 2.69, p = 0.008,
d= 0.31.
The main dependent variable was the actual completion of the
prosocial task at T2. A binomial logistic regression revealed that partic-
ipants in the payment removal condition were more likely to agree to
complete the task (27.22% [20.28, 34.16]) than those in the control con-
dition (15.79% [9.99, 21.59]), B=−0.69 [−1.26,−0.138], SE = 0.29,
p=0.016, odds ratio=0.50. The effect of payment removal on thewill-
ingness to help at T2 was mediated by their attribution to internal mo-
tivations, 95% CI: [−0.089,−0.011], see Fig. 5.
2.2.3. Discussion
In Study 4, participants who were offered an external incentive to
engage in a prosocial behavior that was later removed weremore likely
to engage in that prosocial behavior than those who were never prom-
ised an external reward. Furthermore, mediation analysis suggested
those with removed incentives were more likely to comply because
they attributed their original compliance to intrinsic motivation, rather
than the external reward. The results support our reasoning that the
higher volunteer rate in the former case was due to their desire to pro-
tect the original self-serving attributions they made for helping.
3. General discussion
It is well known that people are skilled at generating attributions
that enhance and protect their moral self-image. We show, however,
that these self-serving attributions carry risk. They can constrain
people's choices when future circumstances put those attributions to
the test. A person who wants to claim that his refusal of a prosocial re-
quest was due to external constraints is trappedwhen those constraints
no longer obtain. He cannot simply shift excuses but rather feels com-
pelled to honor his original claim. To not do so imperils his moral self-
and public-image2 more than does refusing in the ﬁrst place. Similarly
trapped is the person who claims that her compliance with a request
for help was not due to the presence of an extrinsic incentive. Her
claim that her prosocial act reﬂects virtuousness sets up a bigger
moral test (Miller & Monin, 2016) when that incentive is no longer
available. Speciﬁcally, to opt for the self-interested action in these
2 While the effect may be stronger in public contexts, when one faces judgment from
others, we contend that the process is internalized, as participants made anonymous
choices in private. However, the line between self and other judgment is blurred, as one's
own internal moral standards tend to be the internalized standards of close others or so-
ciety. Thus, concerns about judgment from the self and fromothersmaybedifﬁcult to fully
disentangle.
Fig. 5.Mediation analysis from Study 4. Values inﬁgure are logistic regression coefﬁcients.
Value in parentheses indicates remaining direct effect when controlling for motivation.
*p b 0.05, **p b 0.01, ***p b 0.001.
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circumstances would endanger her moral image by invalidating her
previous claim.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the literature examining the strategies
people use to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) that
stems from inconsistencies betweenmoral self-image and self-interest-
ed behavior. That is, people use justiﬁcations to protect and enhance
their moral self-image (Bandura et al., 1996; Mazar et al., 2008; Monin
& Jordan, 2009; Shalvi et al., 2015). We show that these justiﬁcations
can be constrained, leaving people in a more morally precarious place
than they started.
Our results and analysis also provide a potential alternative account
for the well-known door-in-the-face phenomenon (Cialdini et al.,
1975), whereby asking for an extreme favor before a smaller favor in-
creases compliance with the smaller favor. This effect has previously
been attributed to “reciprocal concessions,” such that the person of
whom the request ismade feels obligated to accept themore reasonable
request because he had denied the requester's previous request. How-
ever, our ﬁndings suggest that this effect may depend critically on peo-
ple privately or publically generating excuses for their initial refusal
(e.g., “it is unreasonable”) that then constrains them when a more rea-
sonable request is made.
The ﬁndings in Part II also suggest limitations on the crowding-out
and overjustiﬁcation effects whereby external incentives overwhelm
intrinsicmotivation. That is, amonetary ﬁne can overwhelmmotivation
to engage in prosocial behavior by changing the perception of the be-
havior to an economic exchange (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000) and a
monetary reward can lead people to attribute their behavior to extrinsic
rather than intrinsic motivation (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). Our
ﬁndings demonstrate that if an activity is incentivized positively (in
contrast to negatively, Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000) and has prosocial
beneﬁts (in contrast to non-prosocial behaviors, Lepper et al., 1973),
people will resist attributing their behavior to the presence of an exter-
nal force and, consequently, will show more rather than less engage-
ment in the activity when the external motivator is removed.
An open question is whether this effect would occur for more subtle
or non-conscious justiﬁcation tactics, such as moral licensing, whereby
a good deed bolsters a sense of moral self-worth, allowing people to
subsequently engage in morally questionable behavior (Merritt,
Effron, &Monin, 2010). If such a good deedwas negated (e.g., one thinks
one hired a black job candidate (Monin &Miller, 2001) but the ﬁles had
been switched such that the hired candidate was actually white), per-
haps people would not only lose their moral license, but would feel
morally indebted and subsequently perform more moral deeds.
Finally, the psychology underlying our results can be leveraged to in-
crease prosocial behavior. For example, organizations might emphasize
that ordinary excuses for not engaging in prosocial behavior (i.e., too
much money used for overhead) are not legitimate. Organizations
might also ask people to consider whether they would be willing to
help for self-interested gain before asking whether they would like to
volunteer to help others.
4. Conclusion
When people adopt cognitive strategies to elevate their moral self-
view they restrict their future options if changing circumstances nullify
those strategies. After strategies are nulliﬁed, people are not free to
merely shift to another self-serving cognitive strategy. Instead, they
must “walk the talk” of their original strategies or expose their moral
image to more threat. Self-serving strategies, thus, are double-edged
swords: they raise people's moral self-view but increase its distance to
fall.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.11.004.
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